Introduction
Each year during the second week of November the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverstä ndigenrat) reports its economic outlook to the German chancellor. Besides its recommendations for future economic policy actions, the report includes the forecasts made by the Council and its staff. These projections receive considerable attention from the media, politicians, the academia, and financial market participants alike. While the German government uses the forecasts to prepare its estimate for the tax revenues and government expenditures, policy makers discuss and decide about future economic policy actions in the light of the Council's forecast. Academic scholars evaluate the Council's forecast performance. Dicke and Glismann (2002) find that the Council's growth forecasts were too optimistic during the 1990'ies compared to the time before and, hence, the absolute forecast error has increased over time. Weidmann (2002) shows that other measures of forecast accuracy, e. g. the mean absolute error, do not show a trend in the Council's forecast performance. Smolny (1998) concludes that the Council's forecasts performed better than simple econometric models. However, none of these studies contrasts the Council's forecast to private sector forecasters which is a reasonable strategy to judge the Council's forecast performance. This is done by the Financial Times Deutschland in its January ranking of German forecasters. Although it is not the main purpose of this ranking to evaluate the Council's forecast, in this ranking the Council's projection is published along more than 50 private sector forecasters. Although the Council submits its forecast one month in advance to the private sector forecasters it performs quite remarkable and was placed at the 12 th rank in the January 2007 ranking (Financial Times Deutschland 2007) . In its 2010 ranking the Council was placed the 22 nd rank. The question is whether the financial market uses the Council's projection as a piece of information for its own assessment. To answer this question we contrast private sector forecasts to the Council's projections to analyze whether private sector forecasters place their forecasts around the Council's projection. Such an analysis has important macroeconomic implications. If the Council influences the private sector forecasts, it can contribute to stabilize on the economy. If private sector forecasters respond to the Council's projections, sound macroeconomic forecasts serve as a yardstick for the private sector and reduce uncertainty regarding the future development of the macroeconomy. If, on the other hand, the private sector does not care about and respond to the Council's forecast at all, this would indicate a lack of confidence in the quality of the Council's projections. The literature comparing private sector forecasts to intergovernmental forecasts is relatively sparse. Dö hrn and Schmidt (2011) compare the forecast accuracy of German research institutions and find that the main determinant for forecast accuracy is the forecast horizon. Batchelor (2001) and Blix et al. (2001) compare intergovernmental forecasts to the mean of private sector forecasts and show that the IMF and the OECD provide less accurate forecasts compared to the private sector consensus forecast. Dreher et al. (2008) explain this lack of forecast accuracy reporting that the IMF delivers strategic forecasts to underpin their macroeconomic policy. However, Dovern and Weisser (2010) argue that aggregating among a group of forecasters is inappropriate when investigating the forecast properties, such as accuracy. Hence, this paper focuses on individual private sector forecasts. We document that the Council's forecast accuracy for real economy variables is higher compared to private sector forecasters while for the inflation rate we do not find such a difference. We also provide an explanation of this result. We show that the lack in forecast performance of private sector forecasters is related to the anti-herding behavior of private sector forecasters which implies that private sector forecasters deliberately place their forecasts away from the Council's forecast. While there are many studies on the social interaction among private sector forecasters (Lux 2009) , this is the first study which examines the interaction between private sector forecasts and institutional forecasts. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe in detail the data while in Section 3 we explain the test for herding and anti-herding. In Section 4 we present our main empirical results and a set of robustness tests while in Section 5 we offer some concluding remarks.
The data
To compare the projections of the Council to the private sector forecasts, we use monthly survey data for Germany published in the Consensus Economics forecast poll. In this survey, 54 private sector forecasters 1 are asked to submit their forecasts of several financial and real economy variables, including real growth, private consumption, investment and the fiscal deficit.
2 Our data cover forecasts for the sample period from October 1989 to December 2009 which yields more than 500 forecasts for each variable and each forecast horizon. While we have less than 600 observations for each variable available, in total the data set includes more than 6,000 private sector forecasts and covers 21 annual reports of the Council. The forecasters participating in the survey are institutions such as banks, research institutes, and consultancies in Germany. An interesting feature of the Consensus Economics data is that not only the individual forecasts are published but also the corresponding name of the forecasting institution. Thus, an evaluation of the accuracy of a particular institution's forecast is relatively easy to conduct, which may impinge back on the reputation of this institution with respect to its forecasting activities (Keane/Runkle 1990) . The Consensus Economics survey also contains forecasts for different forecast horizons, i. e., for the current year and the next year. In order to correctly compare the forecast performance of the Council to the private sector and in line with the methodology of the Financial Times Deutschland ranking, we only use the private sector forecasts which are published in the first week of December, 3 i. e. shortly after the release of the Council 's report in mid of November. 4 A disadvantage of any study using private sector forecasts is the possibility that some forecasters simply use their old forecasts rather than submitting a new forecast. This is an important issue since one might mistake the employment of old and consequently inferior forecasts as a reflection of anti-herding. In order to examine the time-series dimension and the cross-sectional dimension of the survey data, Figure 1 plots the time series of (i) the Council's current-year forecast (black squares), (ii) the actual value 5 (solid lines), and, (iii) the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the private sector forecasts submitted in December as measured by the cross-sectional range of forecasts (shaded areas) for the real growth rate, inflation rate and the unemployment rate. The vertical distance between the black squares and the solid line can be interpreted as the Council's forecast error. Since the private sector forecasts and the Council's forecast are published at nearly the same time, they move basically in tandem. However, the figure provides some anecdotic evidence that the Council predicted the real economy development better than the private sector forecasters. For instance, in November 1991 the Council's growth rate (un-1 The complete list of participants is downloadable on the journal's webpage. 2 The exact definition of the variables are: the real growth rate ("Wachstumsrate''), the change in consumer prices ("Index der Verbraucherpreise''), the unemployment rate in percent of labor force, the real change in private consumption ("privater Verbrauch''), the real change in investment in machinery and equipment ("Ausrü stungsinvestitionen'') and the general government balance ("Finanzierungssaldo des Staates''). 3 Results based on the forecasts published in January are similar and available upon request. 4 Interestingly, the number of forecast revisions in December forecasts is higher than the average number. This points to the possibility that the forecasters update their forecasts in December. 5 The actual values are taken from the German statistical office (Statistisches Bundesamt) and, hence, are revised series. employment rate) forecast of 3.4 (5.8) was noticeably closer to the actual value of 3.4 (5.5) than the mean of the private sector forecasters of 3.2 (8.3). Compared to this, concerning the inflation rate Panel B does not show that the forecast ability differs between both groups. This is supported by Table 1 which reports the mean values, the root mean squared error as well as the mean absolute error for the Council's forecasts and the private sector forecasts. Interestingly, the Council significantly provides better forecasts than the private sector for the real growth rate, 6 the unemployment rate and the fiscal deficit as indicated by the significantly lower forecast error. This is not the case for the other variables, differences in the forecast ability only emerges in five out of twelve cases. Hence, the interpretation of the results should not be stressed too far. One reason for these differences might be that some variables are more exposed to media coverage which makes extreme forecasts more likely (Laster et al. 1999; Peterson 2001 ).
Moreover, both groups of forecasters have different incentives when submitting a forecast. This implies that forecasting success, when viewed from the perspective of an individual forecaster, depends on the forecaster's loss function, not necessarily on forecast accuracy. Laster et al. (1999) argue that private sector forecasters are not only interested in forecast accuracy but also want to increase attention. Therefore, they tend to submit extreme forecasts to gain attention on the potential expense of forecast accuracy. The gain in attention is more pronounced the further the forecasts are away from the benchmark forecast. This results in a so called strategic behavior of private sector forecasters which transmits into a rational forecast bias (Petersen 2001; Lamont 2002; Elliott et al. 2008 ).
The next section analyzes the interaction between the private sector and the Council by developing a herding test to explore whether the lack in forecast performance of private sector forecasters compared to the Council is related to strategic behavior.
A Test for herding and anti-herding
The large sample of private sector forecasters participating in the Consensus Economics forecast poll allows addressing the question whether individual forecasters are influenced by the Council's forecast, i. e., whether there is any herding or anti-herding behavior towards or away to the Council's forecast.
7 Bernhardt et al. (2006) suggest an empirical test for herding or anti-herding that can be applied to this question and is used by and Rü lke and Tillmann (2011). While Bernhardt et al. (2006) focus on financial analysts show that exchange rate forecasters deliberately placed their forecasts away from the consensus forecast. Rü lke and Tillmann (2010) provide evidence for strategic forecasting behavior of the Federal Open Market Committee.
The test involves studying the relationship between individual private sector forecasts, the Council's forecast, and the actual value. The test is based on the following considerations. With new information arriving, every forecaster combines all available information to update and form a posterior distribution. The mean of this distribution is the forecaster's best estimate and represents his unbiased forecast. In line with , we assume that this would be the reported forecast apart from any strategic motives. Herding occurs, when forecasters, being aware of the Council's forecast, place their forecast closer to the Council than they would have done otherwise. In this case, forecasters bias a forecast away from their best estimate towards the Council's forecast. Likewise, anti-herding occurs when forecasters bias their forecasts further away from the Council's forecast than they would have done otherwise. If a private sector forecaster issues his best estimate, he submits an unbiased forecast. In this case, he is not influenced by the Council's forecast. Since the Council publishes its forecasts in mid November, we use the private sector forecasts compiled in the first week of December to make sure that the private sector forecasters know the Council's forecast. If a private sector forecaster does not herd and issues an unbiased forecast, i. e., his best estimate, the unconditional probability that his forecast f i;t ½v tþk at time t for the period t þ k 8 exceeds (falls short of) the actual value, v tþk , is equal to the conditional probability given anything in the information set available to the forecaster, including the Council's forecast, f C;t ½v tþk . Accordingly, a test for the herding or anti-herding behavior of forecasts, as proposed by Bernhardt et al. (2006) , can be developed under the null hypothesis of no herding and no anti-herding. Accordingly, the conditional probability of overshooting the actual value given that the forecast is higher than the Council's forecast is equal to unity minus the conditional probability of undershooting the actual value given that the forecast is smaller than the Council's forecast:
The two conditional probabilities, thus, average to 0.5. This is not the case under the alternative hypothesis of herding or anti-herding. If a forecaster herds, biasing the forecast towards the Council's forecast, the forecast will be located between the unbiased private forecast and the Council's forecast. In that case the average conditional probabilities of overshooting the actual value, given that the forecast exceeds the Council's forecast, and undershooting given that the forecast falls short of the Council's forecast, is smaller than 0.5: 1 2 ½Pðv tþk < f i;t ½v tþk j f i;t ½v tþk > f C;t ½v tþk Þþ Pðv tþk > f i;t ½v tþk j f i;t ½v tþk < f C;t ½v tþk Þ < 0:5:
If forecasters anti-herd, in contrast, the average of the two conditional probabilities is larger than 0.5. In this case the forecast overshoots the unbiased private forecast in the direction away from the Council's forecast: 1 2 ½Pðv tþk < f i;t ½v tþk j f i;t ½v tþk > f C;t ½v tþk Þþ Pðv tþk > f i;t ½v tþk j f i;t ½v tþk < f C;t ½v tþk Þ > 0:5:
The test statistic, S, is defined as the average of the sample estimates of the conditional probabilities used in Equations (2) -(3). Bernhardt et al. (2006) show that the test statistic, S, has an asymptotic normal distribution and is robust to various problems arising in the case of, e. g. correlated forecast errors, market-wide shocks, and optimism or pessimism among forecasters. The economic intuition for this property is straightforward. For example, a sequence of positive market-wide shocks during a boom raises (lowers) the conditional probability that the realization exceed (fall short of) the forecast. The resulting shift in the conditional probabilities, however, does not affect the test statistic, S, because the test statistic is defined as the average of the two conditional probabilities. The averaging of the two conditional probabilities in Equations (2) - (3) also implies that the test statistic, S, yields reliable results in case forecasters do not target the median but the mean of an asymmetric distribution over the macroeconomic variable. The test statistic, S, is also robust to outliers in the data and sharp "trend reversals" because the two conditional probabilities are computed as empirical frequencies of events. For example, swings may give rise to a preponderance of unexpected market-wide shocks such as the German reunification in the early 1990's (Fritsche/Kuzin 2004) . Market-wide shocks and the resulting positive cross-correlation of forecast errors do not bias the mean of the S statistic, but only increase its variance below the one obtained in the case of zero cross-correlation of forecast errors. This alleviates the standard error and increases also the size of the confidence intervals. As a consequence, the null hypothesis of no anti-herding is only rejected in very severe cases of anti-herding. In other words, the test statistic S is conservative because positive unexpected shocks make it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness when we should do so (Type II error). This also applies if some forecasters perform consistently worse than others. As long as the forecast forecast error is uncorrelated to the Council's forecast, the test statistic indicates no (anti-)herding. 1989 (1993) . We continued this process of dropping and adding forecasts until we reached the end of the sample period. Figure 2 summarizes the results for the current-year forecasts for the real growth rate, the inflation rate and the unemployment rate. It is interesting to observe that the anti-herding behavior of unemployment forecasts is particularly pronounced in the early 1990'ies. Especially in this period the Council has a better forecast performance compared to the private sector which again mirrors the relationship between strategic forecasting and relative forecasting performance. While the extent of anti-herding of unemployment (inflation) forecasts has decreased (increased) over time, the anti-herding behavior of growth forecasts is relatively stable.
Empirical results
To provide an additional robustness test, we differentiate the herding behavior between optimists and pessimists. To identify both groups we define for every survey the optimists (pessimists) as those forecasters who predicted a higher (lower) growth rate than the mean forecast. Panel B (C) of Table 2 shows the results of the herding test for optimists (pessimists). Interestingly, both groups show anti-herding for the unemployment rate and the fiscal deficit (current-year forecasts) while the optimists also exhibit anti-herding behavior for the next-year forecasts for the fiscal deficit, the real change in consumption and investment. Hence, optimists have a stronger tendency to intentionally deviate from the Council's projections compared to pessimists. A reason for this result might be that optimists tend to provide forecasts more strategically compared to their colleagues. Since the participants of the survey are different kinds of institutions, aggregating the diverse forecasters might neglect different (anti-)herding strategies. Hence, we split the sample in three different groups, namely banks, research institutes and consultancies. The list including the survey participants and the classification of the groups is available on the journal's webpage. Table 3 reports the results and supports the general finding of anti-herding. Interestingly, the anti-herding behavior is more pronounced for banks and less pronounced for research institutes which might reflect that banks have a higher incentive to stand out of the crowd at the expense of forecast accuracy compared to research institutes. Another explanation would be that the vintage of the forecasts differs between these groups. Forecasts in research institutes might be revised on a regular basis and, hence, have on average a shorter forecast horizon compared to banks. Dö hrn and Schmidt (2011) report evidence that the forecast horizon is the main driver for forecast accuracy. This explains why banks exhibit anti-herding behavior while research institutes do not show such a behavior. For the unemployment forecasts Table 3 reports a consistent anti-herding among all groups.
To rule out the possibility that the anti-herding behavior is a mere statistical artifact, we used the professional forecasts published in advance of the publication of the Council's forecast. The results which are available upon request indicate that the test statistic is not different from 0.5 in almost all cases. This reflects that professional forecasts at least partly take the forecasts of the Council's forecast into account. As yet another robustness test, we replaced the Council's forecast by the forecasts of German research institutes, e. g., the ifo institute and the joint forecast (Gemeinschaftsdiagnose). Applying the same methodology show remarkable differences between the Council and other institutions. Hence, the results reported for the Council are related to the Council's forecasts and are not a general result. Finally, we deleted the 'old forecasts' which are formed some time before the survey was conducted. We identified old forecasts as those which are not revised compared to the previous months. This applies to roughly ten percent of the forecasts. Since the remaining forecasts are revised around the same time that the Council publishes its forecast, one might find (anti-)herding behavior in this subsample of forecasts. Table 4 reports the test statistic for those professional forecasters which have revised their forecasts from November to December. The results show that the test statistic is again significantly higher than 0.5 for the growth rate, the unemployment rate and the fiscal deficit while for the other variables the test statistic is not different from 0.5. This strongly supports our baseline results. Interestingly, the next-year growth forecasts exhibit a test statistic higher than 0.5.
Conclusions
In this paper, we contrast more than 6,000 private sector forecasts for Germany published in the Consensus Economics forecast poll to almost simultaneously published projections of the German Council of Economic Experts. We find that the Council's real economy forecasts, i. e. their growth, unemployment and fiscal forecasts have a higher forecast accuracy compared to the private sector forecasters. We also document that for these variables private sector forecasters deliberately place their forecasts away from the Council's projection which is defined as an anti-herding behavior. This result is robust over time but is more pronounced for banks than for research institutes. The strategic forecasting behavior of the real economy variables explains why the private sector forecasters perform worse than the Council. This supports the view of a rational bias in forecasting (Laster et al. 1999; Peterson 2001) showing that forecast accuracy is not the only ingredient in the loss function of private sector forecasters. Forecasters which are not only interested in unbiased forecasts but also aim to increase attention deliver extreme forecasts at the expense of forecast accuracy. However, our analysis does not offer an explanation of why the strategic forecasting behavior is related only to the real economy forecasts. A possible reason is that professional forecasters use extreme forecasts to gain attention only in case of some variables. This is especially relevant in a forecasting contest where forecasters' utility function depends also on media attention (Laster et al. 1999; Peterson 2001 ). Another possibility is that the economic Council has superior information or exploits relevant information more efficiently to forecast macroeconomic variables. This may eventually explain why the Council submits more accurate forecasts compared to professional forecasters for at least some variables.
